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(pure panic) or on rational depositor concerns under
imperfect information. In the latter case, an information
externality underlies market failure. If banks follow a first-
come first-served rule in paying out depositor claims, and
if the quality of bank assets is not observable to deposi-
tors, then depositors who observe problems in the market
as a whole (but who are unable to discern the quality of
individual banks) face a strong incentive to withdraw,
even from banks that are (unobservably) solvent. That
behavior can itself cause otherwise solvent banks to fail
and produce chaos in the payment system and in credit
markets, with significant adverse consequences for firms
and consumers.
But there is another view of deposit withdrawals, one
that emphasizes their value as a means of imposing disci-
pline on banks. Indeed, Charles Kahn and I have argued
that the first-come first-served rule followed by banks
itself may have been designed as a means of placing
bankers under greater discipline than officers of other
firms. The temptation to misallocate funds is greater in
banks than in other firms because bankers are given great
discretion over how to allocate depositors’ funds and
because bankers’ decisions are costly to monitor. The
first-come first-served rule ensures that depositors are
not treated equally as a class—those who are first to
notice a problem receive a reward for doing so. To reward
monitoring in this way can be efficient because it makes
monitoring credible, which in turn makes the banker’s
behavior more reliable, which in turn makes it easier for
depositors to entrust their funds to banks. The threat of
runs on banks, according to this view, causes bankers to
make better portfolio choices ex ante. And when runs
actually occur bankers are removed from positions of
control over bank assets, which prevents bankers’
absconding ex post. Runs, according to this perspective,
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ithdrawals of deposits from banks, 
especially large and rapid withdrawals that may
place many banks in distress and potentially
force their unwarranted closure, are typically
seen as economic nightmares. Such phenomena seem to demonstrate the need for government action to remove the incentive
for depositors to withdraw from banks (as deposit insurance does) or to help banks avoid the consequences of depositor with-
drawals (through assistance from the Fed). Destructive bank runs are blamed either on irrational behavior by depositors
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are the unavoidable consequence of an efficient arrange-
ment that keeps bankers honest and makes bank invest-
ments more productive.
These two views are not mutually exclusive. It may be
that runs on individual banks (one at a time, prompted by
the concerns of the informed depositors of a particular
bank) are desirable, but that runs on banks as a whole
(prompted by the effect of bad macroeconomic news on
uninformed depositors) are undesirable. From that per-
spective, it is possible to argue that runs foster both disci-
pline and chaos. Lest the costs of chaos be overstated, it is
important to recognize how private institutions mitigated
the costs of aggregate runs before the enactment of federal
deposit insurance in the 1930s. The formation of private
bank-clearing houses and other bank coalitions for mutual
protection helped healthy banks to share risk and buttress
each other during difficult times.
Pre-Depression Insurance Coaltions 
the operation of these coalitions, particularly in
the United States, was not perfect. In the United States,
restrictions on branching and consolidation created a sys-
tem of thousands of undiversified
and geographically dispersed banks.
That heightened the need for effec-
tive coalitions to prevent panics, but
ironically also made it much more
difficult to form such coalitions. The
increased need for mutual protec-
tion in the United States followed
from the lack of bank diversifica-
tion, which raised bank asset risk
and thereby increased the vulnera-
bility of U.S. banks to the threat of
runs. The ability to cooperate was
impaired, however, by the fragmented system of banks. To
form effective coalitions banks must be able to establish
and enforce rules that limit free riding on collective protec-
tion. Enforcement requires monitoring among members.
Individual members’ incentives to monitor are dulled when
the number of coalition members is large (i.e., when the
benefits of monitoring are shared, but its costs are borne
individually) and when members are scattered over a large
area (which raises the cost of monitoring). The United
States, therefore, was unnecessarily vulnerable to systemic
problems resulting from moments of confusion about the
incidence of losses within the banking sector.
Nevertheless, even under circumstances in which
coalitions of banks were unable to share risk and thereby
discourage runs, the failure to prevent panics did not
spell disaster. When collective action was inadequate the
resulting banking panics did not produce massive bank
failure; rather, banks limited convertibility of deposits
into cash in the wake of large sudden deposit with-
drawals. In essence, during times when information
about individual banks was poor and all banks were
experiencing withdrawals, the authorities insulated
banks (and society as a whole) from the costs of bank clo-
sures by temporarily releasing banks from the legal oblig-
ation to pay cash to all depositors. All of this is not to say
that bank runs were costless, but rather that the financial
system developed means of substantially mitigating the
costs of aggregate runs.
A New View of the Depression
it was the great depression and the unprecedented
upheaval felt in the banking sector during the early 1930s
that brought massive government protection to banks in
the form of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(which made loans to banks and invested in banks’ pre-
ferred stock issues) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (which insured some bank deposits). Friedman
and Schwartz famously argued that unlike previous bank-
ing crises, the institutional response to the panics of the
Great Depression was inadequate. The founding of the Fed,
in their view, placed the burden of institutional response
on the Fed rather than on private banks’ decisions to coin-
sure one another against withdrawals or to suspend con-
vertibility. According to Friedman and Schwartz, the Fed
did not act as it should have to stem the protracted outflow
of deposits from the banking system. The Fed’s failure to
inject liquidity into the banking system made the panics of
the Depression more severe than previous panics. That
failure to deal with aggregate banking panics set the stage
for new government intervention to solve the information
externality problem of bank panics.
But new research suggests that the standard interpre-
tation of banking collapse and government intervention
during the Depression needs fundamental revision in
four respects. First, recent research suggests that the
banking crises of the 1930s for the most part were not the
result of depositor confusion and information externali-
ties but rather resulted from observable bank weakness.
Second, new research also suggests that withdrawals of
bank deposits often targeted observably weak banks and
operated as an effective means of depositor discipline.
Third, the conventional view that private coalitions were
unwilling or unable to act effectively to insulate solvent
banks from the threat of unwarranted runs has also been
qualified by evidence of successful collective action in the
most famous case of an identifiable panic—the run on
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The Fed’s failure to inject liquidity into the 
banking system made the panics of the 
Depression more severe than previous panics 
and set the stage for government intervention. 
Chicago banks in June 1932. Fourth, studies of the politi-
cal economy of the passage of deposit insurance suggest
that its passage did not reflect a consensus in favor of
deposit insurance on economic grounds. Federal deposit
insurance was the result of congressional logrolling by its
advocates, who saw in federal deposit insurance a means
of protecting small risky banks at the expense of health-
ier large banks. Together these four sets of findings imply
a dramatic rewriting of the record of banking instability
during the 1930s and its policy implications.
Causes of Failures Elmus Wicker argues that bank failures
during the early 1930s were largely (though not entirely)
a continuation of the process of agricultural decline that
had produced a wave of agricultural bank failures during
the 1920s. Eugene White shows that the determinants of
bank failure during the 1920s are quite similar to the
determinants of failure in 1930. The notion that banks
were failing because of fundamental, observable losses,
and that failures stretched over many years suggests a
much smaller role for asymmetric information or bank
panic in understanding bank failures during the 1930s.
Selective Market Discipline In two of my papers—one
studying chicago banks during the early 1930s (with
Joseph Mason), the other analyzing New York City banks
during the entire interwar period (with Berry Wilson)—I
find that deposit withdrawals varied greatly across banks.
Banks that should have been judged as riskier ex ante suf-
fered greater withdrawals of deposits. The study of
Chicago banks uses failure prediction models to estimate
ex ante failure risk, while the study of New York banks
uses balance sheet and stock price information to esti-
mate the risk of bank failure. In both cases, individual
bank risk was a significant predictor of deposit with-
drawal, which suggests that depositor withdrawal was a
source of market discipline that penalized banks for
observable weakness. In the case of New York, we also
studied how banks responded to discipline. We found
that when the risk of default rose and deposits fell, banks
tried to restore depositor confidence by contracting lend-
ing (to reduce asset risk) and by cutting dividends (to
reduce leverage).
Our study of Chicago banks permitted an analysis of the
clearest and most famous case of an asymmetric-informa-
tion banking panic during the Great Depression—the June
1932 Chicago panic. The panic was confined to Chicago and
clearly traceable to local shocks to the value of bank assets.
Widespread withdrawals on city banks (from both ex post
solvent and ex post insolvent banks) occurred for several days
and several banks failed during the
panic. In our paper, we asked
whether any healthy banks failed
during the panic. To address that
question we divided the sample of
Chicago banks into three categories:
those that survived through mid
1932, those that failed during the
panic, and those that failed outside
the panic window. We asked
whether the banks that failed during
the panic shared ex ante characteris-
tics with those that failed at other
times and whether the characteristics of panic failures sug-
gest that they were among the weakest banks.
By all ex ante measures of default risk (including inter-
est paid on deposits in the year prior to the panic, the
decline in deposits in the year before the panic, estimated
failure probability, and market valuation of bank assets)
banks that failed during the panic were observably
weaker banks (compared with panic survivors) months
in advance of the panic. Furthermore, in all cases where
we were able to find examiner records, examiners noted
significant problems at those banks months in advance
of the panic, including large loan losses and dishonest or
imprudent banking practices. We conclude that although
many solvent banks experienced some withdrawal of
deposits during the panic, only the weakest banks failed.
Cooperation Among Solvent Banks Several of the strongest
Chicago banks did experience large withdrawals of
funds, and one bank in particular was almost shut down
voluntarily by its managers to stem continuing with-
drawals. Thus there was depositor confusion during the
Chicago panic and it might have forced at least one bank
to fail (and possibly others in its wake). But the Chicago
clearing-house banks acted as a group to support the
threatened institution. By pledging their joint support for
the bank they were able to help it qualify for assistance
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Because
the RFC maintained very strict collateral requirements in
1932, cooperation among the Chicago banks was essen-
tial to preventing the closure of the threatened bank.
Thus we conclude that cooperation to resolve informa-
tion externalities was still feasible and possibly impor-
tant during the Depression.
The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance If bank failures
and withdrawals of deposits from banks during the
Depression typically did not reflect uninformed panic,
but rather fundamental weakness, then why did advo-
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Federal deposit insurance was the result of congres-
sional logrolling by its advocates, who saw in federal
deposit insurance a means of protecting small risky
banks at the expense of healthier large banks.
cates of federal deposit insurance claim otherwise? As
Mark Flood shows in his review of the deposit insurance
debate of the 1930s, deposit insurance was opposed by
officials in the Treasury and the Fed, by influential
bankers, by Sen. Carter Glass, and by President Roosevelt.
It did not win the day because of convincing economic
arguments about its value for avoiding unwarranted
runs. Indeed, the fact that deposit insurance was limited
to small deposits suggests that owing to asymmetric-
information problems it would have had very little ability
to prevent runs on banks. What deposit insurance did
succeed in doing was to bring to a halt the bank merger
wave of the 1920s by removing the incentive for small
banks to participate in diversifying consolidation.
In my paper with Eugene White examining the polit-
ical struggle over federal deposit insurance we argue that
deposit insurance was a payoff to politicians who repre-
sented the interests of small bankers, who had been push-
ing for federal deposit insurance since the 1880s, and
who saw in federal insurance protection of small deposits
(funded by equal charges on all banks) a means to obtain
a transfer from large banks. Large banks were better
diversified and had fewer small deposits; thus small
banks stood to gain from risk pooling through the insur-
ance fund at the expense of large banks. 
Deposit insurance is not just a transfer from the
strong to the weak. It is a highly distortionary means of
transferring funds because the amount of resources
implicitly transferred to a bank through insurance pro-
tection is an increasing function of both the riskiness of
bank assets and bank leverage. Because deposit insurance
subsidizes risk, it promotes banking system fragility. The
last 20 years have witnessed an unprecedented wave of
banking system collapses. Many researchers have shown
that deposit insurance itself is largely to blame for the vul-
nerability of banking systems within the United States
and around the world. Interestingly, this incentive prob-
lem of deposit insurance was well understood at the time
of the passage of federal deposit insurance, owing to the
fact that several states had experimented (all unsuccess-
fully) with deposit insurance for state-chartered banks
during the post-World War I period. My study of those
state deposit insurance systems shows that states with
mandatory deposit insurance produced the most vulner-
able banking systems, ceteris paribus, and saw the largest
losses to their state-chartered banks during the agricul-
tural price collapse of the 1920s.
Conclusion
together, new research on the history of banking
instability and regulation in the United States suggests
the need to reevaluate views of the inherent instability of
banking systems and the value of deposit insurance. It
also suggests that it is both desirable and feasible to incor-
porate market discipline into banking to promote greater
efficiency and stability. Although it may not be politically
feasible or economically desirable to repeal federal
deposit insurance outright, it is certainly desirable to find
ways to force banks to meet market-risk standards on the
margin. In other research, economists, including myself,
have argued that it is possible to combine insurance of
deposits with market discipline by requiring that banks
maintain a minimum proportion of credibly uninsured
debt as part of their financing mix. This approach enjoys
the support of many policymakers in a wide variety of
countries. The new interest in restoring market discipline
to the banking system reflects a dramatic shift in opinion
about the costs and benefits of insulating banks from the
penalties imposed by their creditors.
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